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Geoffrey 3 Butler, Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Dear Mr . 'But I e,i;:; 
Re: .Johnson vs. Rogers, et al. 
Case No. 20622 
I represent Donald Rogers in the above-referenced matter, which 
is scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday, November 12, 1986, 
at 9:00 a.m. Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, I would like to supplement my argument, that 
evidence of intoxication alone is insufficient to justify an 
award of punitive damages, found on Page 3 of the Brief on Ap-
peal of respondent, Donald Rogers. The Supreme Court of Arizona 
recently decided the case of Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. 
Co., 723 P.2d 673 (1986). One of the major issues in that case 
dealt with punitive damages and what mental state was required 
for the imposition of such damages. The Court concluded as 
follows: 
As discussed earlier, it is the "evil mind" that 
distinguishes action justifying the imposition 
of punitive damages. . . . In whatever the req-
uisite mental state is expressed, the conduct 
must also be aggravated and outrageous. It is 
conscious action of a reprehensible character. 
The key is the wrongdoer's intent to injure the 
plaintiff or his deliberate interference with the 
rights of others, consciously disregarding the 
unjustifiably substantial risk of significant 
harm to them. . . . While the necessary "evil 
mind" may be inferred, it is still this "evil 
mind" in addition to outwardly aggravated, out-
rageous, malicious, or fraudulent conduct which 
is required for punitive damages. We hold that 
before a jury may award punitive damages, there 
must be evidence of an "evil mind" and aggravated 
and outrageous conduct, [Emphasis added.] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Geoffrey J. Butler 
October 30, 1986 
Page 2 
For the Court's convenience, I enclose herewith a photocopy of 
the Linthicum decision. 
Very truly yours, 
p j^-Tldx^ 
P. Keith Nelson 
PKN:s 
cc Lowell V. Smith 
Edward J. McDonough 
Gordon L. Roberts 
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LINTHICUM v. NATIONWIDE LIFE INS. 
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jtndra LINTHICUM, widow, surviving 
wife and Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Jerry Linthicum, deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
•• 
SATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE CO., 
an Ohio corporation, and Dan R. Wag-
non and Associates, Inc., an Arizona 
corporation, Defendants-Appellants. 
No. CV 86-0061-PR. 
Supreme Court of Arizona, 
In Banc. / - .v 
July 23, 1986. 
Reconsideration Denied Sept. 9, 1986. 
Suit was brought against insurer and 
b claims agency for breach of contract 
tad bad faith. The Superior Court, Marico-
pa County, Cause No. C-446562, Robert 
Hertzberg, J., awarded compensatory and 
punitive damages. The Court of Appeals, 
Ariz.App., 723 P.2d 703, reversed the puni-
tive damage award, but affirmed on all 
•her issues, and review was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Cameron,' J., held that 
*hile insurer may not have dealt with the 
insureds in good faith, there was not suffi-
cient evidence of an evil mind, illustrating a 
«sire to consciously disregard insureds' 
rights and therefore punitive damages 
*ere not warranted. i 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
» • * . 
\ Damages <3=>87(1) - ^ 
Exemplary or punitive damages are 
those damages awarded in excess of full 
toinpensation to victim in order to punish 
^ wrongdoer and to deter others from 
^ulating his conduct. , , v, 
* Damages <3=>91(1) 
In deciding whether punitive damages 
^ awardable, inquiry should be focused 
*P°n the wrongdoer's mental state; wrong-
e r must be consciously aware of the 
**°ngfulness or harmfulness of his con-
^ct and yet continue to act in the same 
manner in deliberate controvention to the 
rights of the victim. 
3. Damages <3=>184 
Before a jury may award punitive dam-
ages there must be evidence of an "evil 
mind" and aggravated and outrageous con-
duct. •• ,.;•...' .  ;•;;.. •'',.: .."•.• .i ". .. • ,'..' :.L<v ;^ ' 
4. Damages <3=»184 
Burden of proof for punitive damages 
is by clear and convincing evidence. 
5. Insurance <3=>602.2( 1) v 
Punitive damages are recoverable in a 
bad-faith action where defendant's conduct 
is aggravated, outrageous, malicious or 
fraudulent, combined with an evil mind as 
evidenced by showing that defendant was 
consciously aware of the needs and rights 
of the insured and nevertheless ignored its 
obligations. " '- •'•* ••••••• .•-: •- • < ; 
6. Insurance <3=>602.2(1) 
While insurer may not have dealt with 
the insureds in good faith, there was not 
sufficient evidence of an evil mind, illus-
trating a desire to consciously disregard 
insureds' rights and therefore punitive 
damages were not warranted in a bad-faith 
action. : -**• •• ' ^ -*>v:-:r--...:•: •:•.;:;;; 
Hofmann, Salcito, Stevens & Myers by 
Robert D. Myers and Leroy W. Hofmann, 
Phoenix, for plaintiff-appellee. ' !,: ~'^ ; 
McCord & Howe by Warren S. McCord, 
Scottsdale, and Kornblum, Kelly & Herlihy 
by Guy 0 . Kornblum and Abigail S. Kelly, 
San. Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appel-
'lants.
 t. ,'..... ,_. , . .^....:/. 
Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon by Louis 
A. Stahl, William S. Hawgood, II and Susan 
Gaylord Gale, Phoenix, for amicus curiae 
American Council of Life Ins. and Health 
Ins. Assoc, of America. V -..'*.•.,: 
Langerman, Begam, Lewis and Marks by 
Amy G. Langerman, Phoenix, for amicus 
curiae Arizona Trial Lawyers Assoc. ':" 
CAMERON, Justice. . • ;^ 
This is a petition for review of a decision 
and opinion of the court of appeals which 
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affirmed a jury award of compensatory 
damages for bad faith against Nationwide 
Life Insurance Company, but reversed the 
award of two million dollars in punitive 
damages. Linthicum v. Nationwide Life 
Insurance Company, — Ariz. — , 723 
P.2d 703, [1985]. We have jurisdiction pur-
suant to art 6 § 5(3) of the Arizona Consti-
tution, A.R.S. § 12-120.24 and Rule 23, 
Ariz.R.Civ.App.P., 17A A.R.S. 
We granted oral argument on the peti-
tion for review and asked that counsel di-
rect their attention to the following ques-
tions: 
1. Assuming that indifference to or fail-
ure to consider the interests of the 
insured is sufficient grounds for 
award of tort damages in a bad faith 
case, what additional requirement or 
standard is appropriate to justify an 
award of punitive damages? 
2. Does the evidence in this case meet 
or fail to meet that standard? 
After oral argument We granted the peti-
tion for review as to the issue of punitive 
damages only. We affirm the decision and 
opinion of the court of appeals as to the 
other issues considered by that court 
The facts follow. In September 1979, 
Jerry Linthicum (Jerry) was hospitalized by 
his family physician, Dr. James Skinner. A 
tumor on one of his parathyroid glands1 
was surgically removed by Dr. Robert A. 
Brock on 28 September 1979. At that time, 
Jerry's physicians, Dr. Skinner and Dr. 
Brock, plus the pathologist at Phoenix Gen-
eral Hospital, Dr. Voit, determined based 
upon tissue samples that it was parathy-
roid adenoma, ie. a benign tumor. How-
ever, as these tumors can be differently 
interpreted, some representative slides 
were sent to the Mayo Clinic for verifica-
tion. A pathologist at the Mayo Clinic, Dr. 
Edward Soule, also diagnosed it as parathy-
roid adenoma. The final diagnosis in the 
summary addendum of Phoenix General 
Hospital, prepared by Dr. Vericolli, also 
states parathyroid adenoma. 
1. There are four parathyroid glands -located 
within the thyroid gland. The parathyroid 
Following his surgery, Jerry was i*. 
quired to see Dr. Skinner monthly to ban 
his blood tested for any surgery induced 
hypocalcemia (low blood calcium) or a reo£ 
currence of his prior symptoms. He a&> 
returned to work, gained twenty-fii| 
pounds, and resumed his active lifestyle 
• "*'^M§ 
Effective 1 April 1980, Sandra Iinthica3| 
(Sandra) obtained medical insurance fron 
Nationwide Life Insurance Company (N^ 
tionwide) through a group insurance policy 
issued to her employer, Arizona Optica^  
Company. The policy was also to include 
coverage for her husband, Jerry, as a d£K 
pendent Sandra never received a copy at 
this policy, but instead was simply added a^  
a certificate-holder of the policy issued to, 
Arizona Optical Company. Both the group* 
policy and the certificate contained the fok 
lowing limitation as to preexisting illness^ 
Eligible expenses do not include w£jr. 
charges incurred . . . (7) for an illness foi;; 
which the Insured Person received me&i 
cal care or treatment within the 90 days „ 
preceding the effective date of his insur-? 
ance hereunder The term "treatrf 
ment" includes the taking of any drug 
prescribed by a physician. J lH§g 
During the ninety day period prior, to^ 
Sandra's insurance becoming effective, Dr^ 
Skinner saw Jerry on 16 January, 25 FeWL 
ruary and 18_ March 1980, for blood testeT^ 
The March blood test revealed that hifcr 
blood pressure and calcium level were both «* 
slightly elevated (hypertension and hyper- ~£ 
calcemia). Dr. Skinner prescribed a bloody 
pressure medication, Enduronyl Forte,-
Jerry also received treatment from a Dr. 
Emerson, during February, for a shoulder 
injury 
On 12 June 1980, Jerry became ill while .&. 
playing softBall. Dr. Skinner had Jerry ^ 
admitted to Phoenix General Hospital and S 
later transferred him to the Hospital of the II 
Good Samaritan in Los Angeles, California, % 
under the care of Dr. Leonard Rosoff. At *| 
both hospitals, Sandra gave the Nationwide 
glands secrete a hormone which regulates the 
amount of calcium in the body. 
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pScy number as part of the requested 
prance information. 
On 11 July 1980, Dr. Rosoff operated on 
jjty and discovered extensive metastatic 
irtinoma (cancer) of the parathyroid 
iapds. Dr. Rosoff removed the entire thy-
^d gland, including the three remaining 
leithyroid glands, but he was unable to 
*aove all the cancer as it had spread 
troughout the neck and into the chest 
gn. Dr. Rosoff and Dr. Roger Terry, a 
Angeles pathologist, examined the 
coords and tissue samples from Jerry's 
3T9 surgery. They disagreed with the 
jmious diagnosis and concluded that the 
amor discovered in 1979 had been malig-
aat and not benign. 
The bills from Phoenix General Hospital 
ed the Hospital of the Good Samaritan 
w e submitted to Nationwide. The claim 
n s processed by Ms, Georgia Nihoff, sen-
' claims examiner. Ms. Nihoff testified 
4at she followed Nationwide's normal pro-
•dure concerning claims by new insureds 
«d initiated an investigation to determine 
i the claim was valid or excludable as a 
frtexisting illness. Mr. Richard Schlade, 
toother claims examiner, testified that one 
< the first bills submitted to Nationwide 
**s from a radiologist and referred to the 
*riier surgery for parathyroid adenoma. 
A form letter was sent to Arizona Optical 
Resting the names and addresses of all 
**tors that had seen Jerry since 1 January 
**0i and further requesting the Linthi-
eains to give authorization for Nationwide 
*• obtain medical information from these 
**tors. This letter did not state that the 
^dical information sought was part of an 
**estigation concerning whether the claim 
***>uld be denied as a preexisting illness. 
Upon receipt of the authorization and list 
^doctors, Nationwide sent each physician 
|4<Dear Doctor" letter. These form letters 
guested information concerning any con-
^ the doctor had with Jerry, either in 
^ o n or by telephone. The letters also 
^fcht: any symptoms Jerry exhibited, di-
•fltosis by the doctor, medications pre-
Knb
^d or services rendered, fees charged 
and finally any information on treatment 
rendered by any other doctors. 
Dr. Skinner responded to such a letter by 
stating that he had moved his practice and 
that all Jerry's medical records were in the 
possession of his former employer, Dr. 
Luke. Dr. Luke, however, claimed that he 
did not have the records. Ms. Nihoff then 
sent another form letter to Dr. Skinner for 
"reconsideration". Dr. Skinner again stat-
ed that Dr. Luke had the medical records. 
Dr. Skinner also stated.that Jerry's cafe 
was "complicated" and that Nationwide 
should call him if they had any questions. 
Dr. Luke, in response to a second letter, 
provided dates, diagnosis, (hyperparathy-
roidism with hypercalcemia, hypertension), 
medication and charges for Jerry's monthly 
office visits during January, February and 
March 1980. Dr. Luke also indicated that 
these visits were follow-up care from his 
1979 surgery and that Jerry was a patient 
of Dr. Skinner's during this time, not his. 
Dr. Rosoff responded to a similar inquiry 
from Nationwide. Dr. Rosoff stated that 
Jerry had parathyroid carcinoma but that 
his treating physicians did not know this 
prior to July 1980. He submitted discharge 
summaries to this effect prepared by him-
self and Dr. Bruce Larson, an endocrinolo-
gist, who also treated Jerry at the Hospital 
of the Good Samaritan in Los Angeles. At 
trial, Dr. Skinner testified that, in hind-
sight, he now believes the tumor removed 
in 1979 was probably cancerous. 
Nationwide also received the admitting 
records and discharge summaries from Jer-
ry's 1979 surgery at Phoenix General Hos-
pital. These records contained the conclu-
sion that the 1979 parathyroid tumor was 
benign. However, the confirmation letter 
from Dr. Soule at the Mayo^  Clinic concern-
ing the tumor is absent from the Nation-
wide file. 
Ms. Nihoff made the final decision to 
deny Jerry's claim based upon her determi-
nation that he had been receiving treat-
ment for cancer during the ninety day ex-
clusionary period even though the cancer 
was undiagnosed at that time. Ms. Nihoff 
testified that the treatment consisted of the 
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office visits and blood tests. She further 
stated that it was her understanding of 
Nationwide policy that treatment could in-
clude any contact with a doctor, such as 
visiting his office or talking with him on 
the telephone. 
On 20 October 1980, a denial letter was 
sent to Arizona Optical. This letter stated 
that Jerry's claim was denied because he 
had received treatment "for this illness,, 
within ninety days of the policy's effective 
date. It further stated that a review of the 
denial was possible upon request. The de-
nial letter was sent only to Arizona Optical, 
as the policyholder, even though Nation-
wide knew that Sandra Linthicum no long-
er worked there. Sandra did not receive a 
copy of this letter and states she was not 
informed of the denial. 
Jerry was hospitalized again at Phoenix 
General Hospital on 28 October 1980. 
When Sandra gave the admitting personnel 
her insurance information, she was in-
formed that Jerry's previous hospital bill 
had not been paid. Upon telephoning Na-
tionwide from the hospital, Sandra states, 
she was informed by Ms. Nihoff for the 
first time that the claim had been denied on 
the basis of a preexisting illness. Subse-
quently, Jerry was transferred to Mercy 
Clinic at St. Joseph's Hospital as a charity 
patient From October 1980 until his death 
in February 1982, Jerry remained a charity 
patient at Mercy Clinic, receiving out-pa-
tient treatment between hospital stays. 
Dr. Skinner testified that it was his opinion 
that Jerry eventually became paralyzed 
due to the delay involved in obtaining treat-
ment through Mercy Clinic. Dr. Skinner 
felt the paralysis was avoidable, and could 
have been prevented if Jerry could have 
afforded private care. Additionally, San-
dra, her twelve year old son, other family 
members, and friends administered medi-
cations and cared for Jerry at his home. 
After an inquiry by a Phoenix newspaper 
column, "Answerline", Nationwide re-
viewed its denial in April 1981. Mr. Rich-
ard Schlade, after reviewing the file, con-
cluded that the denial was justified. Mr. 
Schlade was persuaded by Dr. Rosoff s de-
termination that Jerry had cancer in 197} 
and that his previous doctors had misdia^ 
nosed i t Further, Mr. Schlade testified 
that Dr. Larson's discharge summary in& 
cated that hypercalcemia and hypertenskm 
were secondary to or caused by parathy 
roid carcinoma. From this, Mr. Schlai 
drew a causational link to the hypercalci£ 
mia and hypertension reported in w 
records of Dr. Luke and determined Jerr| 
had parathyroid cancer and had received 
treatment for it or a symptom caused by% 
during the ninety days prior to the effec-
tive date of Nationwide's policy. 
-^  
Later, Ms. Mary Beth Miller, the claim! 
department supervisor, conducted another 
review of Jerry's claim. She also conclirf 
ed that Jerry had been treated for cancel 
or a symptom of it during the ninety daj ?a exclusionary period, based upon Dr. 
son's report that hypercalcemia and hype? 
tension are due to parathyroid carcmonS 
Ms. Miller, however, showed some unce? 
tainty about this conclusion and therefore 
sent the file to the home office, where*' 
was referred to Mr. Richard Kokesh, u j | 
Group Filed Services Manager for Natb&v 
wide. 4 ^ 
Prior to Mr. Kokesh reviewing the ffle^J 
was initially examined by his assistant Mfc 
Pat Tweeton, a senior claims exainmefc 
She wrote on the file: r:rjffl| 
Rich, I think they did an excellent j3fc 
on this file. I re-reviewed the whqfc 
thing and came to the same conck 
they did. 
I feel the claim is preexisting. Tb* 
problem is, if it is a problem, that W 
doctors doing the 1979 surgery did vat 
diagnpse as cancer. So neither doctor 9 
patient knew this. 
My suggestion would be to stick f 
denial and advise Wagnon not to disc 
with media. 
In his review Mr. Kokesh agreed, --^, 
eluding primarily on the basis of the opfl* 
ions of Drs. Rosoff and Terry, that 
denial was justified. ••'-"*-:*•'. u c £ $ 
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teer la ifgt Wifter Jerry's death, Sandra brought suit 
iad I Q | ^ ^ m^nst Nationwide and its claim agency, 
de t i i t ^ JLpon, f°r breach of contract and bad 
mmaryW S<|. A jury awarded Sandra $14,951.13 
typerteaihi S t breach of contract, $150,000 for bad 
ky<pfiw^ j&k and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. 
£*• ScUtfr Y * M^rt °f appeals reversed the punitive 
hyp<frw>4fr M * ^ ^ award but affirmed on all other 
trd IjS^jp^'yn We granted review to examine the 
of punitive damages. 
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BE STANDARD FOR IMPOSITION 
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
i When Punitive Damages May Be Im-
posed 
HI Exemplary or punitive damages are 
£toe damages awarded in excess of full 
wpensation to the victim in order to pun-
jdfcthe wrongdoer and to deter others from 
•dating his conduct. Cassel v. Schacht, 
A Ariz. 495, 496, 683 P.2d 294, 295 (1984); 
J-**ser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 2 at 
s o m e ^ ® ^ ! 1 ^ ed- 1984)*> D o b b s> Handbook on the 
w^ of Remedies § 3.9 at 204 (1973); Re-
galement (Second) of Torts § 908. Other 
*»nales, besides punishment and deter-
J*ce, utilized as justification for punitive 
fcaages include preserving the peace, in-
king private law enforcement, compen-
•ting victims for otherwise unrecoverable 
*ses,
 an^ financing the costs of litigation. 
®s, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of 
Native Damages, 56 So. Cal.L.Rev. 1, 3 
WZ). 
ft] In deciding whether punitive dam-
^ are awardable, the inquiry should be 
k&sed upon the wrongdoer's mental 
*te. Dobbs, supra. To recover punitive 
n^&ges something more is required over 
*d above the "mere commission of a tort" 
flings v. Apodaca, — Ariz. — , — , 
^ P.2d , [No. 18333-PR, filed 22 
^ 1986], (slip op. at 28); Prosser & Kee-
**, supra, § 2 at 9-10. The wrongdoer 
J^t be consciously aware of the wrong-
**foess or harmfulness of his conduct and 
™> continue to act in the same manner in 
derate contravention to the rights of 
^ victim. Rawlings v. Apodaca, supra 
^P.2dat . (slip op. at 29-30). It is 
^7 when the wrongdoer should be con-
agreed, cofr; 
s of the 
rry, that jb* 
sciously aware of the evil of his actions, of 
the spitefulness of his motives or that his 
conduct is so outrageous, oppressive or in-
tolerable in that it creates a substantial 
risk of tremendous harm to others that the 
evil mind required for the imposition of 
punitive damages may be found. Id. 
This court and the court of appeals have 
attempted to express and illustrate the 
type of "evil mind" necessary for punitive 
damages in many ways and in a myriad of 
contexts. Unfortunately, this has resulted 
in an ambiguous, overbroad list of "catch 
phrases" from which attorneys pick and 
choose in an effort to obtain punitive dam-
ages. The various characterizations of 
conduct allowing recovery of punitive dam-
ages include: 
(1) Malice—express or implied, Arizo-
na Publishing Co. v. Harris, 20 
Ariz. 446,181 P. 373 (1919); Magma 
Copper Co. v. Shuster, 118 Ariz. 
151, 575 P.2d 350 (App.1977); 
(2) Spite or ill will, State Farm Mutu-
al Insurance Co. v. St. Joseph's 
Hospital, 107 Ariz. 498, 489 P.2d 
837 (1971); 
(3) Evil intent or bad motive, Smith v. 
Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 
900 (1977); McNelis v. Bruce, 90 
Ariz. 261, 367 P.2d 625 (1962); 
(4) Gross negligence, Gila Water Co. v. 
Gila Land and Cattle Co., 30 Ariz. 
569, 249 P. 751 (1926); Iaeger v. 
;"' Metcalf, 11 Ariz. 283, 94 P. 1094 
(1908); 
(5) Wanton, reckless or willful acts, 
Lutfy v. R.D. Roper & Sons Motor 
Co., 57 Ariz. 495, 115 P.2d 161 
• (1941); 
(6) Intentional misconduct, Id.; Wet-
zel v. Gulf Oil Corp., 455 F.2d 857 
(9th Cir.1972); 
(7) Fraud, Jenkins v. Skelton, 21 Ariz. 
663, 192 P. 249 (1920); 
(8) Oppression, Id.; Salt River Water 
Users' Association v. Giglio, 113 
Ariz. 190, 549 P.2d 162 (1976); Jer-
man v. O'Leary, 145 Ariz. 397, 701 
P.2d 1205 (App.1985); • 
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(9) Extreme, aggravated or outrageous 
conduct, Lerner v. Brettschneider, 
123 Ariz. 152, 598 P.2d 515 (App. 
1979); 
(10) Conduct involving an unreasonable 
. risk of causing distress, Wetzel v. 
Gulf Oil Corp., supra,; 
(11) Reckless disregard for or indiffer-
ence to the rights, interests or safe-
ty of others, Smith v. Chapman, 
supra.; Salt River Water Users9 
Association v. Giglio, supra; Sel-
linger v. Freeway Mobile Homes 
Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 521 P.2d 
1119 (1976); Neilson v. Flashberg, 
101 Ariz. 335, 419 P.2d 514 (1966); 
McNelis v. Bruce, supra; Schmidt 
v. American Leasco, 139 Ariz. 509, 
679 P.2d 532 (App.1983); 
(12) Criminal acts or conduct, Puz v. 
McDonald, 140 Ariz. 77, 680 P.2d 
. 213 (App.1984); 
(13) Acts done in bad faith, Huggins v. 
Deinhard, 127 Ariz. 358, 621 P.2d 
45 (App.1980). 
The numerous expressions of the conduct 
and mental state required for punitive dam-
ages has broadened its scope but loosened 
its impact. 
[C]ourts have developed a large vocab-
ulary to describe the kind of mental state 
required—the defendant must be "mali-
cious", "reckless", "oppressive", "evil", 
"wicked", or guilty of "wanton miscon-
duct", or "morally culpable" conduct 
Since all of these words refer to the 
same underlying culpable state of mind, 
and since courts have not been at all 
concerned with any shades of difference 
that might be found between, say, malice 
and recklessness, almost any term that 
describes misconduct coupled with a bad 
state of mind will describe the case for 
punitive damages. 
Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, 
§ 3.9 at 205. Having juries decide whether 
to award compensatory vs. punitive dam-
ages based on vague verbal distinctions 
between mere negligence, gross negligence 
and reckless indifference is often futile and 
nothing more than semantic jousting by 
opposing attorneys. Further, it leads to 
misapplication of the extraordinary chfl 
remedy of punitive damages which should 
be appropriately restricted to only the most 
egregious of wrongs. "A standard that 
allows exemplary awards based upon gron 
negligence or mere reckless disregard o( 
the circumstances overextends the ava^ 
ability of punitive damages, and dulls the 
potentially keen edge of the doctrine as aa 
effective deterrent of truly reprehensible 
conduct." Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 Aid 
1353, 1361 (Me.1985). ^ 
We find ourselves in agreement with the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine and "per-
ceive cogent reasons for avoiding an ove* 
broad application of the [punitive damages] 
doctrine." Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 AJSdst 
1360. The type of tortious conduct justify-
ing punitive damages should be only those 
limited classes of consciously malicious j * 
outrageous acts of misconduct where pufr 
ishment and deterrence is both paramount 
and likely to be achieved. -•••'•""i f^r 
[3] We, therefore, conclude that a'fell 
broad standard for punitive damages jl 
needed. As discussed earlier, it is the "ell 
mind" that distinguishes action justifying 
the imposition of punitive damages. Sjf 
Rawlings v. Apodaca, supra. In whatevtf 
way the requisite mental state is ^ 
pressed, the conduct must also be aggrava-
ted and outrageous. It is conscious actk* 
of a reprehensible character. The key j * 
the wrongdoer's intent to injure the plafr 
tiff or his deliberate interference with t|* 
rights of others, consciously disregard!^ 
the unjustifiably substantial risk of sign*)* 
cant harm to them. Rawlings v. Apod(M 
— P.2d at . (slip op. at 27). Wh* 
the necessary "evil mind" may be i n f e r w 
it is still this "evil mind" in addition^ 
outwardly aggravated, outrageous, ©** 
cious, or fraudulent conduct which is t* 
quired for punitive damages. We hold thi» 
before a jury may award punitive damag** 
there must be evidence of an "evil minf 
and aggravated and outrageous condttj 
• • - t > « 4 | 
B. Burden of Proof For Punitive i ^ E 
ages . ' 'v , • • ••^™B 
[4] In examining the currently ta<|| 
scope of punitive damages, we reach a l l 
lated ' 
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irrently broad 
we reach a W. 
farted issue, the burden of proof in a claim 
for punitive damages. As this remedy is 
only to be awarded in the most egregious 
of cases, where there is reprehensible con-
duct combined with an evil mind over and 
above that required for commission of a 
tort, we believe it is appropriate to impose 
a more stringent standard of proof. When 
punitive damages are loosely assessed, 
they become onerous not only to defend-
ants but the public as a whole. Additional-
ly, its deterrent impact is lessened. There-
fore, while a plaintiff may collect compen-
satory damages upon proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence of his injuries due to 
the tort of another, we conclude that recov-
ery of punitive damages should be awarda-
ble only upon clear and convincing evidence 
of the defendant's evil mind. See Tuttle v. 
Raymond, 494 A.2d at 1362-1363. In mak-
ing this distinction, we are not alone. See 
e.g. Tuttle v. Raymond, supra; Travelers 
Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 
349 (Ind.1982); Wangen v. Ford Motor 
Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); 
Or.Rev.Stat. § 30.925 (1981); Minn.Stat. 
Ann. § 549.20 (1984); See also Colo.Rev. 
Stat. § 13-25-127(2) (1973) (proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt); Wheeler, The Constitu-
tional Case for Reforming Punitive Dam-
ages Procedures, 69 Va.L.Rev. 269, 296-
298 (1983) (recommending such a higher 
standard). We hold that the burden of 
proof for punitive damages is by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
G Punitive Damages in Bad Faith 
Claims 
[5] In the instant case, we consider 
whether punitive damages may be awarded 
to a case involving the tort of bad faith. 
ages are recoverable in a bad faith action 
when the defendant's conduct is "aggrava-
ted, outrageous, malicious or fraudulent" 
combined with an evil mind as evidenced by 
a showing that the defendant was con-
sciously aware of the needs and rights of 
the insured and nevertheless, ignored its 
obligations. —» P.2d at . (slip op. at 
30). We hold that punitive damages may 
be awarded in a bad faith case. Rawlings, 
supra.
 ( . ; - - . . . . -
IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
^ IN THIS CASE? 
[6] In the case before us, the court of 
appeals held that the award of punitive 
damages was not justified. We agree. 
While Nationwide may not have dealt 
with the Linthicums in good faith, there is 
not sufficient evidence of an evil mind, 
illustrating a desire to harm consciously 
disregard the Linthicum's rights, as is nec-
essary to warrant punitive damages. We 
reach this conclusion irrespective of wheth-
er the burden of proof is clear and convinc-
ing evidence or the lesser standard of a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Initially we note, as did the court of 
appeals, that "certain of the alleged acts of 
misconduct [by Nationwide] were specifi-
cally approved by Arizona law. For exam-
ple, the practice of issuing an insurance 
certificate to summarize the terms and con-
ditions of the policy, and transmitting that 
certificate to the insured through her em-
ployer, is authorized by . . . A.R.S. § 20-
1402." Linthicum v. Nationwide Life In-
This question was recently answered by surance Company, 12$ P.2d at 714. 
«is court in Rawlings v. Apodaca, supra. 
w a bad faith tort case, as with all other 
torts, punitive damages are not awardable 
Unless there is something more than the 
conduct required to establish the tort. 
Rawlings v. Apodaca, — P.2d at ; 
8% op. at 28; Farr v. Transamerica Occi-
dental Life Insurance Co., 145 Ariz. 1, 8, 
699 P.2d 376, 384 (1984). However, as we 
*tated in Rawlings, supra, punitive dam-
Other acts of misconduct alleged by the 
Linthicums to warrant punitive damages 
include: sending a denial of claim* letter 
only to Arizona Optical and not to Sandra; 
not disclosing the medical basis for the 
denial; investigating all dependent claims 
filed in the first year of coverage for poten-
tial denial; not directly asking any of Jer-
ry's doctors whether he had treated Jerry 
during the ninety day exclusionary period 
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before issuing its denial; strictly constru-
ing its policy against the,insured; conduct-
ing only fake reviews of the claim denial 
after a newspaper inquiry; refusing to pro-
vide Sandra with a copy of the policy; 
knowing the harm a denial would cause the 
Linthicums and denying the claim anyway. 
While we do not entirely agree with the 
court of appeals characterization of these 
facts as "procedural errors on the part of 
Nationwide", neither do we find them suffi-
cient to support an award of punitive dam-
ages. Linthicum v. Nationvride Life Ins. 
Co., 723 P.2d at 714. 
Admittedly, Nationwide does appear to 
construe its policy strictly in its own favor. 
Investigating all dependent claims filed 
within the first year for potential denial 
and denying all claims upon any possible 
supportable basis is definitely not in the 
insured's interest. These facts are defi-
nitely relevant to a claim for bad faith; 
however, without evidence of an "evil 
mind" there is not a claim for punitive 
damages. Nationwide follows a tough 
claims policy but it is not "aggravated, 
outrageous, oppressive or fraudulent". 
The knowledge of the harm its denial 
was causing the Linthicums is definitely 
relevant to proving an "evil mind". If it 
had been shown that there was a deliberate 
ignoring of the Linthicums' rights and 
needs, then punitive damages might* have 
been awardable. In the instant case, Na-
tionwide reviewed the file several times 
because of the gravity of the situation.. 
While the petitioner may not be satisfied 
with the procedures utilized in these re-
views, they do not appear to be designed to 
deny valid claims. We do not find suffi-
cient evidence to affirm the punitive dam-
age award. 
We reverse and vacate the award for 
punitive damages and affirm the remainder 
of the judgment of the trial court and the 
opinion of the court of appeals. 
HOLOHAN, CJ., GORDON, V.CJ., and 
HAYS and FELDMAN, JJ., concur. 
**'*% 
Eric H. MARCUS and Irene M. Marcus, $ 
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• - . . - - • • " • • • v . 
Lillian L. FOX, a single woman, and, 
Robert A. Gold, a single man, 
Appellants. 
No. 18552-PR. ~" 
••-"- Supreme Court of Arizona, 
En Banc. \.i 
July 25, 1986. 
Reconsideration Denied Sept. 9, 1986. 
Action was brought seeking damages^ 
based on a claim that a contract was fraud-*! 
ulently induced. The Superior Court, PiroaJ 
County, Nos. 196669 & 210316, Robert B^| 
Buchanan, J., entered judgment on a WS.£ 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff but refused^ 
to award attorney fees. The Court of Aj£V 
peals, 723 P.2d 691, affirmed a denial of theT; 
request for attorney fees, and plaintiff peti-^ * 
' tioned for review. The Supreme Court,j| 
Hays, J., held that an action for rescission^ 
and/ or damages based on a claim that Bt 
contract was fraudulently induced is one., 
"arising out of a contract" within meaninju 
of attorney fees statute.
 ti: , '-^m 
Vacated and remanded. 
•: yWt 
Costs <3=»173(1) 
An action for rescission and/or dam^ 
ages based on a claim that a contract was^  
fraudulently induced is one "arising out of^  
a contract" within meaning of attorney* 
fees statute. A.R.S. § 12-341.01, subd. A«| S U l t u i / v . *-..-.
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